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Abstract
The Wenchuan Earthquake of May 2008 in Sichuan, which was five months prior to 
the start of the Beijing Olympics in August, on the one hand caused major damage to 
Chinese society, but on the other hand the speedy response of the Chinese govern-
ment and the recovery work became a major source of prestige for China, the same 
as the Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo. In accordance with the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disas-
ters, the Earthquake Mitigation and Disaster Relief Command Center was set up in 
the State Council, with Prime Minister Wen Jiabao exercising overall command. In 
June, the Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance 
was formulated, and then in August, the National Wenchuan County Earthquake 
Recovery and Reconstruction Comprehensive Plan. Support for the recovery was 
carried out competitively using the pairing-support method. The three-year plan was 
shrunk to two years and the fact that it was actually completed in a two and a half 
years was publicized as a great achievement of the Communist Party. The Great 
Western China Development Plan, a project begun before the earthquake, was also 
accelerated alongside the earthquake recovery. While on the hand the government-
initiated rapid response achieved a recovery that was possible precisely because it 
was done by the Chinese government, on the other hand, problems remain in  
reconstructing the lives of the individual disaster victims, including the problem of 
domestic disparities and the fluid population, which were concerns from before  
the earthquake. Also, the earthquake became an opportunity to press from change in 
Chinese society, including becoming the starting point following the launch of the 
new China for the activities of various volunteers and NGOs.
Key words: China, Sichuan Great Earthquake, recovery plan, pairing support 
(one-to-one support), China’s NGO Year One
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1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is, while comparing the earthquakes in Sichuan of the Wenchuan 
Earthquake on May 12, 2008, and the Lushan Earthquake five years later on April 20, 2013, both 
in Sichuan, to verify the characteristics and problems of the Chinese government’s disaster-
recovery measures and to identify the problems in Chinese society that were brought to the 
surface by these earthquakes.
The Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008 was a major earthquake in China, which up to that point 
had not been known as a country of earthquakes, and it was widely reported on both domestically 
and internationally. Generally speaking, the Sichuan Earthquake refers to the earthquake with a 
magnitude of 8.0 that occurred on May 12, 2008, at 2.28 p.m. with an epicenter in Wenchuan 
County, Sichuan Province (70kms from Chengdu City, the provincial capital) (subsequently, the 
May 12th Wenchuan Earthquake) and also the earthquake that occurred five years later in 
Sichuan Province on April 20, 2013, with a magnitude of 7.0 known as the Sichuan Lushan 
Ya-an Earthquake (subsequently, the April 20th Lushan Earthquake). Major disasters in China 
had hardly been reported prior the 2008 earthquake and international society, which already 
focused on China prior to its holding of the Beijing Olympics in August, was surprised by the 
occurrence of such a major earthquake in China. This disaster caused the most damage of any 
disaster since China was newly founded as a nation in 1949. While on the one hand China made 
responding to it itself a priority, on the other hand it accepted an unprecedented level of support 
from international society and also reported on the earthquake. After the 2008 Wenchuan 
Earthquake, awareness had grown in international society that China is a country of many 
earthquakes, in part due to the announcements of the Chinese government. Following the 
magnitude 7.1 Yushu Earthquake of April 14, 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao arrived at the 
scene of the disaster on the 15th around 6pm and took control of the rescue operations. Also, 
President Hu Jintao, who was visiting Brazil for the BRICs Summit, urgently returned to China 
and arrived at the scene of the disaster on the 17th. But conversely, in contrast to the Wenchuan 
Earthquake of 2008, China strictly regulated 
support from overseas and the entry of foreign 
reporters. Its basic policy following the Lushan 
Earthquake of April 20, 2013, was also to deal 
with the problem domestically. As a result, 
people were not aware of the local conditions in 
the disaster-affected areas and it is frequently 
heard that the damage from the April 20th 
Lushan Earthquake was not that great. However, 
as we can see in Table 1, it was certainly not the 
case that the damage was insignificant. The 
Photograph: The Chinese Communist Party’s 
English-language magazine (June 2013)
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China Youth Daily (April 23, 2013) noted that “lessons had not been learned,” and that many of 
the buildings constructed after the Wenchuan Earthquake had been destroyed. But while support 
was not accepted from overseas, publications such as the Chinese Communist Party’s English 
language magazine did report in special features that the lessons from 2008 had been fully 
utilized and that the response to the earthquake had been performed skilfully.
Up until recently, China was not known as a country affected by earthquakes, such as Japan 
is. But in actuality, it has experienced quite a few major earthquakes in its history. However, 
because they are not as frequent as in Japan and also because they are rarely reported on, it can 
be said that they have not attracted that much attention both domestically and internationally and 
also that China’s earthquake recovery experiences have not been shared. Table 2 shows the main 
earthquakes China has experienced in its history. In terms of its recent experiences, the main 
earthquakes since the Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008 are shown, even if they did not reach 
magnitude (M) 7.0. We can see that in addition to in Sichuan and Qinghai, major earthquakes 
frequently occur in regions where many ethnic minorities live, such as Xinjiang and Yunnan. 
There has been practically no reporting of the earthquakes that occurred in Xinjiang. While on 
the one hand the regions where earthquakes occur do include mountainous districts and deserts 
where few people live and so little damage is caused, on the other hand there are cases where 
table 1. 
A comparison of the major earthquakes in western China
Earthquake name Sichuan Wenchuan Earthquake Qinghai Yushu Earthquake
Sichuan Lushan Earthquake 
(Yu-an Earthquake)
Time of occurrence May 12, 2008, 14.28 April 14, 2010, 7.49 April 20, 2013, 8.02
Magnitude 8.0 7.1 6.6
Epicenter Wenchuan County, Ngawa 
Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous 
Prefecture, Sichuan Province 
(70km from Chengdu) (on the 
Longmenshan Fault)
Yushu County, Yushu Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai 
Province
Longmen Town, Lushan County, 
Ya-an City, Sichuan Province 
(on the Longmenshan Fault)
Number of fatalities 69,277 people 2,968 people 196 people
Number of injured 374,643 people 12,315 people 12,200 people
Number missing 17,923 people 270 people 21 people
Damage to homes 216,000 collapsed
4.15 million were damaged
15,000 private homes collapsed 
(near to the epicenter, more than 
90% of homes collapsed).
About 100,000 people lost their 
homes.
17,000 houses and 56,000 
buildings collapsed.
Between 45,000 to 147,000 
houses were completely 
destroyed.
Between 150,000 to 718,000 
houses were completely or 
partially destroyed. (Note*1)
Note*1): The data on homes damaged in the Sichuan Lushan (Ya-an) Earthquake is from Zhai, Kun·Akihara, 
Masato (2013) “Conceptual Research on the Recovery from the Sichuan Ya-an Longmen Great Earthquake” 
(http: //www.think-t.gr.jp/katudou/pdf/2013-No9.pdf).
4OSAKA HUMAN SCIENCES
information on earthquakes has been controlled for political reasons.
In addition to the Wenchuan Earthquake of 2008, the Tangshan Earthquake of 1976 is another 
example of a major earthquake in China in the past from which international society realized that 
China is a country where major earthquakes occur. However, it was difficult to ascertain the 
extent of the damage caused by the 1976 Tangshan Earthquake due to the authorities’ control of 
information, such as the prohibition on taking cameras into the disaster-affected areas. Three 
Japanese nationals working for Hitachi who were in China to establish a joint venture died in 
this earthquake when the hotel they were staying in was completely destroyed. It was not until 
three years after this earthquake that it was announced that 250,000 people had died in it. This 
was announced by Deng Xiao Ping, who had recovered from a fall from power to become, in 
actual terms, the People’s Republic of China’s supreme leader. We can analyze that time of 1976 
as being a special, cautious period in China’s history (Otani, 2009). The Tangshan Earthquake 
table 2. 
The major earthquakes in China’s history
Date Earthquake name Magnitude (M) Fatalities (people)
December 1920 Haiyuan earthquake (海原地震) 8.5 235,502
May 1927 Gulang earthquake (古浪地震) 8.0 41,419
August 1931 Fuyun earthquake (富蘊地震) 8.0 10,000
December 1932 Changma earthquake (昌馬地震) 7.6 200 (700,000)
August 1933 Diexi Earthquake (畳渓地震) 7.5 9,365
August 1950 Assam-Tibet Earthquake (西蔵察隅―墨脱) 8.6 3,300
March 1966 Hebei Province-Xingtai Earthquake (河北省寧晋邢台地震) 7.2 1,000 (8,064)
January 1970 Tonghai Yunnan Province Earthquake (雲南省通海地震) 7.8 15,621
February 1973 Luhuo Sichuan Province Earthquake (四川省炉霍地震) 7.6 2,199
May 1974 Zhaotong Yunnan Province Earthquake (雲南省昭通地震) 7.1 1,541
February 1975 Haicheng Liaoning Earthquake (遼寧省海域地震) 7.3 200 (1,839)
July 1976 Tangshan Hebei Province Earthquake (河北省唐山地震) 7.8 242,800
May 2008 Sichuan Earthquake (Wenchuan) 四川大地震（汶川） 8.0 69,277
August 2008 Yunnan Panzhihua Earthquake (雲南攀枝花地震) 5.9 36
May 2009 Xinjiang Earthquake (新疆地震) 5.2
July 2009 Guantun YunnanYao’an Earthquake (雲南姚安地震) 5.7 1
April 2010 Yushu Earthquake (青海地震) 7.1 2,968
March 2011 Yingjiang County Yunnan Earthquake (雲南盈江地震) 5.5 25
September 2012 Yiliang County Yunnan Earthquake (雲南貴州地震) 5.7
April 2013 Lushan Sichuan Earthquake (Ya-an) (四川芦山地震（雅安）) 6.6 196
February 2014 Xinjiang Earthquake (新疆地震) 7.3
Source: The table was prepared by the authors and is mainly based on the table in the Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 
2008, and the table China’s Earthquake Dangers, broadcast in the NHK special, China’s Wenchuan Earthquake, 
on May 24, 2008. (www.nliro.or.jp/disclosure/q_kenkyu/No14_2_1.pdf　date of access: November 25, 2008) 
combined with other materials. There are some differences in the number of fatalities depending on the source. 
The table shows the most severe earthquakes only and many others have occurred. It has been further revised by 
the authors (from Otani, 2009).
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struck Hebei Province near Beijing on July 28, 1976.
On January 8, 1976, Zhou Enlai died, and then on July 6, the founder of the People’s Liberation 
Army Zhu De also died. Then Mao Tse-tung died on September 9. It can be estimated that there 
was much turmoil within China’s Communist Party on whether these deaths would mark the 
start of a new China and so it is considered that is strictly controlled information on disasters, 
which might fan the flames of social unrest among the people (Otani, 2009).
In the Wenchuan Earthquake recovery, it can be said that there clearly appeared an 
administrative style of the Chinese government encouraging a top-down approach. The Chinese 
Government and the Communist Party would use the progress reports on the recovery as 
opportunities for grand announcements. In March 2009, just before the one year anniversary of 
the earthquake, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao reported in the National People’s Congress that 
while up to that point the target for the time period for the completion of the recovery in the 
disaster-affected areas had been set as three years, it had been shorted by one year to “within 
two years.”
President Hu Jintao also announced at the memorial ceremony for the one year anniversary 
of the Wenchuan Earthquake that the recovery had been accelerated and would be “completed 
in two years.1” He announced that the goal was “for the disaster victims to return to living 
comfortable lives as soon as possible” (Otani, 2012). On October 1, 2009, about one and a half 
years after the earthquake, at an event to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of 
the new China2, the exceptional speed of the recovery from the Wenchuan Earthquake was 
praised as one of the greatest achievements of the new China. China’s central television station 
announced in a propaganda style report that two years after the Wenchuan County Earthquake, 
“Lives are being newly created and transformed in the disaster-affected areas as a result of the 
reconstruction efforts over two years.” However, the government did not clarify how many 
people had already moved into the more than 1.4 million homes that it had built for the disaster 
victims in the rural villages in the disaster-affected areas (Otani, 2012). On July 20, 2011, which 
was date of the celebration of the 90th anniversary of the founding of China’s Communist Party, 
the recovery following the Wenchuan Earthquake was proclaimed to be one of the greatest 
achievements of the Communist Party (Otani, 2012). China was praised internationally following 
the success of the Beijing Olympics in August 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010, which were 
major international events connected to China’s prestige. In this context, it could be said that 
China was sensitive to making sure that it did not have its feet pulled from under it through the 
failure of its Sichuan recovery policies.
1 The Sankei Shimbun, May 13, 2009 “President Hu Jintao “Recovery achieved in two years,” One Year Memorial 
Ceremony of the Sichuan Earthquake
2 Yomiuri Shimbun, May 13, 2009, “The political use of the Chinese tragedy, the Sichuan Earthquake, one year later; 
on the 60th anniversary of the nation’s founding, President Hu Jintao emphasizes “unity”
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2. The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protecting Against  
and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake 
Disasters (established December 1997, enforced March 1998) is China’s general law for dealing 
with earthquakes. But it could not respond appropriately for the post-earthquake recovery 
measures following the Wenchuan Earthquake and in December 2008, this law was revised for 
the first time in 11 years. Various natural disasters, such as major floods, had occurred in China 
since it was established as a nation in 1949 and natural disasters were recognized to be critical 
events for the nation. But in the beginning, the government’s basic policy was one of “self help” 
and it hardly provided any relief to disaster victims. Following the Great Leap Forward and the 
policy failure that resulted in famine, from 1963 the government recognized that it should also 
provide disaster relief. However, this relief policy collapsed during the Cultural Revolution from 
1966 to 1976. The Ministry of Civil Affairs was established in 1978 after the Cultural Revolution, 
and it was mandated to provide disaster relief to rural communities. Subsequently, in 1989, 
which was the United Nation’s Year of International Disaster Reduction, China also established 
the China International Disaster Mitigation 10 Year Committee (Otani, 2012)3.
With regards to present day China’s emergency-response plan, Miyao (2012) provided an 
overview of the overall framework of China’s emergency-response plan for unforeseen incidents 
and also outlined its emergency-response plan for natural disasters and introduced some of their 
problems.
The Chinese government positioned the recovery from the Wenchuan Earthquake to be a 
major project connected to the prestige of the nation. As was previously mentioned, the 
government responded rapidly and the nation’s leaders immediately visited the disaster-affected 
areas. Premier Wen Jinbao established an Earthquake Measures Headquarters on the same 
day as the earthquake struck and took control of the efforts in the disaster-affected areas (Otani, 
2009 & 2012). President Hu Jintao was in Switzerland attending the World Economic Forum, 
but he returned immediately to China and visited the disaster-affected areas on the fifth day after 
the earthquake. The government’s response was also exceptionally rapid for the construction of 
temporary housing. The construction of the temporary housing began on the 19th, one week after 
the earthquake, and people started moving in to the housing 10 days later, on the 29th (Otani, 
2009 & 2012). Compared to the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, in which people moved 
into the temporary housing three months after the earthquake, and also compared to the 
experiences in the disaster-affected areas following the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, the 
fact that people began moving in 10 days after construction started indicates a very fast response. 
The disaster-affected areas following the Wenchuan Earthquake covered a wide area and demand 
3 Please refer to Otani (2012) on the history of China’s disaster-recovery policies
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in terms of the numbers of temporary housing 
required in the various places was completely 
different, and so subsequently the construction 
of temporary housing continued for several 
months. However, compared to the temporary 
housing in Japan, which were designed to have 
external shared facilities including toilets, 
bathrooms, and kitchens, the construction work 
in China omitted certain aspects, such as the 
installation of water pipes.
The response of the Chinese government to 
the Wenchuan Earthquake was rapid and it 
immediately established a national earthquake emergency disaster relief system. As prescribed 
by the Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters (established December 
1997, enforced March 1998), the Earthquake Mitigation and Disaster Relief Command Center 
was set up within the State Council. Premier Wen Jinbao took overall control and seven hours 
after the disaster, he had already visited the disaster-affected areas, and his visit was widely 
reported by the media. Even before that, two hours after the earthquake, a disaster relief 
emergency response system was put in place by the National Disaster Prevention and Mitigation 
Committee, the National Emergency Disaster Relief Force was mobilized, and also requests 
were made to mobilize the People’s Liberation Army and the armed police force. This extremely 
rapid establishment of a system for the initial mobilization is worthy of praise (Miyairi, 2011). 
In the background to this was the fact that the administrative style of the Chinese government 
that encouraged a top-down approach made possible a fast response. It was also possible because 
the national equipment management system established following the outbreak of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)4 in 2003 proved to be effective (鄧, 2010., Zhang · Otani, 2014).
In December 2008 following the Wenchuan Earthquake, the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters was revised and at this time, 
the State Council Legislative Affairs Office and the China Earthquake Administration compiled 
a report on the main lessons to be learned from the major earthquakes, which were summarized 
by Gu (2009) into the following seven points. ① The creation and implementation of an 
earthquake mitigation plan had not been sufficient. ② There had been insufficient observations 
by the state in the earthquake priority observation regions. ③ There had been insufficient capital 
investment in earthquake observations and forecasts, which impeded observation capabilities. 
④ The overall ability to mitigate damage from earthquakes in urban areas was weak. ⑤ Hardly 
any homes were designed to be earthquake-proof in rural villages. ⑥ Local residents’ awareness 
4 Please refer to Otani (2007) Section 3.5. SARS (page 65-100).
Photograph: temporary housing in Xinxingzhen, 
Pengzhou City (there were medical facilities, 
fire stations, etc., in each town) (taken by the 
author on August 9, 2008)
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of earthquake mitigation was low, their self-help and shared-help abilities were insufficient, and 
they had not formed organizations for mitigation. ⑦ The earthquake emergency disaster relief 
system was incomplete and rules had not been formulated to recover people’s lives, such as for 
shelter tents and temporary housing.
3. The Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance  
and the National Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction  
Comprehensive Plan
On June 1, based on a decision of the State Council’s Earthquake Mitigation and Disaster 
Relief Command Center, the Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery Plan team was established. 
On June 4, the Standing Committee of the State Council passed, in principle, the Wenchuan 
County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance. This ordinance (formulated on 
June 8, 2008), which was the first to be formulated in China, was a special recovery law and a 
government ordinance related to the government-led recovery and reconstruction. Specifically 
targeting regional disasters, in total it is comprised of 9 chapters and 80 articles. Starting with 
the “philosophy” for the recovery and reconstruction following the Wenchuan Earthquake, it is 
a law that provides for this recovery and reconstruction from the emergency response through 
to the recovery plan, and prescribes the entire framework for the methods and processes for the 
recovery and reconstruction.
“The principles” of the earthquake recovery and reconstruction were prescribed to be as 
follows. ① Integrating disaster-affected areas own powers of self-recovery, state support, 
and pairing support; ② combining government-initiated measures and social participation; 
③ combining a local recovery and reconstruction and relocation and new construction in remote 
locations, ④ combining prioritizing qualitative aspects with prioritizing efficiency, ⑤ combining 
addressing immediate problems with a long-term outlook, and ⑥ combining the economic 
development of society and the protection of the ecological environment and resources, etc. 
The firm policies when implementing measures as practice included “having people as the 
standard,” “scientific planning,” “consideration for unification and for each field,” “progressive 
implementation,” “self-recovery capabilities,” “state support,” and “social assistance.”
On August 12, the National Development and Reform Commission published its proposal for 
the National Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Comprehensive Plan 
(master plan) (Otani, 2009 & 2012), and aimed to have the published national proposal 
determined by three months from the earthquake. Its August 12th announcement was approved, 
in principle, by the Standing Committee of the State Council on the 27th. The objective set in 
the published master plan was to have recovered the lives destroyed by the earthquake and 
economic activities to at or above the level prior to the earthquake by three years. Table 3 shows 
the overall structure of the comprehensive plan.
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table 3. 
The Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance and the National Wenchuan 
County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Comprehensive Plan
The Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery 
and Reconstruction Ordinance, June 2008
The National Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Comprehensive Plan (master 
plan) August 2008
Objective To have recovered the lives destroyed by the earthquake and economic activities to at or above the level 
prior to the earthquake by three years.
Introduction A list of the institutions that contributed to formulating the plan, table of contents, 
foreword
Analysis of the 
disaster
Chapter 1 Founda-
tions of the recovery
The overall conditions in the disaster-affected areas, disaster damage, the prob-
lems faced, and advantageous conditions
General outline of 
the recovery
Chapter 2 The overall 
requirements
Guidance concepts, basic principles, and recovery targets
Chapter 3 Spatial 
arrangement
Three regional divisions in the disaster-affected areas (optimal reconstruction 
region, moderate reconstruction region, and ecology reconstruction region), 
Securing recovery divisions, urban arrangements, industrial locations, securing 
housing for residents, land arrangements
Itemized discussion 
on the recovery
Chapter 4 Housing in 
urban areas and rural 
villages
Construction and repair of housing for residents of rural villages and urban areas
Chapter 5 Urban 
construction
Policy of recovery and reconstruction in urban areas; municipal administration 
public-use facilities; cities, towns, and villages with famous history and culture
Chapter 6 Rural 
village construction
Policy of recovery and reconstruction for rural villages: agricultural production 
and agricultural services-related, agricultural infrastructure
Chapter 7 Public 
services
Education and scientific research, Medical treatment and hygiene, cultural and 
physical education, cultural heritage and natural heritage, work, social security, 
and social management
Chapter 8 Infrastruc-
ture facilities
Transportation, communication, energy, and water supply
Chapter 9 Industrial 
recovery
Industry, tourism, commercial trade, finance, and the culture industry
Chapter 10 Disaster 
prevention and 
mitigation
Disaster prevention, disaster mitigation and rescue
Chapter 11 Ecological 
environment
Ecosystem recovery, Environmental maintenance, land maintenance and re- 
reclamation
Chapter 12 Mental 
health measures
Humanism and ethnic spirit
Planning,  
implementation,  
and policy
Chapter 13 Policy 
measures
Government finance, tax, finance, land, industry, pairing support (one-to-one 
support), assistance, and other policies
Chapter 14 Recovery 
capital
Demand for capital and funding measures, reform financing, capital arrangement
Chapter 15 Plan 
implementation
Organizational guidance, plan management, classification implementation, securing 
goods, and checks and inspections
Source: Otani, Junko (2009), “Contemporary China as seen from the Wenchuan Earthquake—together with a 
comparison of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake and the Fukuoka Western Offshore Earthquake,” Journal of 
the Asia Center Kyushu University, No. 3, p.35, revised by the author (materials). With reference to State 
Council’s Earthquake Mitigation and Disaster Relief Command Center Recovery and Reconstruction Design 
(2008), Wenchuan County Earthquake Damage Recovery and Reconstruction Basic Plan, “Window on Sichuan, 
“Overall conditions of the earthquake damage and recovery work (1-1) (2010), (Japan-China Economic 
Association and the Sichuan Province Cooperation information site) and (Kamada, 2011) (Miyairi, 2011).
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Support for the disaster-affected areas was not just disaster recovery, it also included various 
development plans originally formulated before Sichuan was struck by the earthquake, which 
included China’s economic growth policy and plan to significantly develop western China. For 
example, it originally included the construction of a high speed expressway connecting Chengdu 
City, the capital of Sichuan Province, with Dujiangyan City, and the plan was completed by May 
2010. By speeding up its completion, it was used for symbolic publicity to eradicate people’s 
suspicions that the success of the Beijing Olympics would be given priority and that the recovery 
in the disaster-affected areas would be postponed. In the Subsidy Program for Electronic 
Appliances policy, people in rural areas received a subsidy of 13% for purchases of electronic 
appliances specified by the government, such as televisions and washing machines. This also 
helped to reconstruct the lives of rural people in the disaster-affected areas (Otani, 2012). The 
implementation of the earthquake recovery supported and accelerated the Great Western China 
Development Plan. It was a policy to counter the discontent felt by the people in western China 
about the problem of disparities within China, about which there had been concerns from before 
the earthquake.
4. Policy of “pairing support (one-to-one support)5
Pairing support is a method that has been used as an economic development policy in China 
since the 1970s. It is a mechanism for provinces and directly-controlled cities that are 
comparatively economically developed to provide one-to-one support to other regions that are 
lagging behind. This method was also adopted for the recovery in the Wenchuan Earthquake 
disaster-affected areas. A lot of support flowed into the disaster-affected areas, but quickly the 
government came up with a pairing support (one-to-one support) policy and determined which 
province or city would support which disaster-affected area (Table 4) and these provinces and 
cities would then compete to produce the best support results. Comparatively wealthy provinces 
were allocated areas that had suffered more extensive damage, so although a province such as 
Guizhou Province, which was the first to provide assistance, was adjacent to Sichuan Province, 
it was subsequently not allocated to provide assistance to it as it was a comparatively poor 
province. This was to avoid a bias of support concentrated in one place or duplicated support. 
But there was also a perception that it was a return to a government-led system, including among 
the movement of volunteers of Chinese people who voluntarily came to help in the disaster-
affected areas following the earthquake. The recovery took place comparatively quickly and the 
quality of the construction was good in those regions that received the support of affluent 
provinces and cities, such as from Shanghai City or Guangdong Province. This policy of pairing 
5 Pairing support (対口) refers to the forming of pairs and in Japanese corresponds to “pairing support (ペアリング
支援)” or the “counterpart method (カウンターパート方式).”
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support (one-to-one support), entailing the pairing of a disaster-affected area with a regional city, 
contributed to speeding-up the recovery.
The main details of the pairing support for the Wenchuan Earthquake are as follows. (1) 
Preparing a recovery plan, construction design, consulting by specialists, services such as 
engineering and construction and supervision; (2) constructing housing in urban areas; (3) 
maintaining schools, hospitals, and public facilities, such as for culture, sports, and social 
welfare; (4) Constructing infrastructure facilities, such as roads in urban areas, water drainage, 
gas, and electricity; (5) constructing infrastructure facilities for agriculture and in rural villages; 
(6) providing a labor supply and job opportunities and providing services, such as for agricultural, 
science and technology; and (7) offering incentives for business investment and factory 
construction and constructing market-service facilities, including for commercial distribution. 
In other words, we can see that the support was for the hard aspect of establishing and maintaining 
infrastructure.
table 4. 
Allocation of pairs in the Wenchuan County earthquake disaster-affected areas recovery and reconstruc-
tion “pairing support (one-to-one support)”
Shandong Province ⇒ Beichuan Qiang Autonomous County Sichuan Province
Guangdong Province ⇒ Wenchuan County Sichuan Province
Zhejiang Province ⇒ Qingchuan County Sichuan Province
Jiangsu Province ⇒ Mianzhu City Sichuan Province
Beijing City ⇒ Shifang City Sichuan Province
Shanghai City ⇒ Dujiangyan City Sichuan Province
Hebei Province ⇒ Pingwu County Sichuan Province
Liaoning Province ⇒ An County Sichuan Province
Henan Province ⇒ Jiangyou City Sichuan Province
Fujian Province ⇒ Pengzhou City Sichuan Province
Shanxi Province ⇒ Mao County Sichuan Province
Hunan Province ⇒ Li County Sichuan Province
Jilin Province ⇒ Heishui County Sichuan Province
Anhui Province ⇒ Songpan County Sichuan Province
Jiangxi Province ⇒ Xiaojin County Sichuan Province
Hubei Province ⇒ Hanyuan County Sichuan Province
Chongqing Province ⇒ Chongzhou City Sichuan Province
Heilungjiang Province ⇒ Jiange County Sichuan Province
Shenzhen City ⇒ Wen County Gansu, Wudu District, Kang County, Zhugqu County
Tianjin City ⇒ Ningqiang County Shaanxi Province, Lueyang County
《汶川地震灾后恢復重建対口支援方案》the State Council 辦公庁 June 11, 2008《汶川地震灾后恢復重
建总体划》the State Council September 19, 2008
Reference: 《汶川地震灾后贫困村重建进程与挑战》黄承伟・向德平 (ed.) Social Sciences Academy Press 
China, 2011, p.45. Map of Sichuan Province, Chengdu Cartographic Publishing House, 2010, p.124-125
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The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake is of reference for measures for a large-area disaster. 
It was verified that a sense of responsibility among the supporting prefectures and continuity for 
the work was secured through the use of pairing support. For example, in the Union of Kansai 
Governments, Kobe City assisted Natori City, Nishinomiya City, and Minami Sanriku Town6. 
While referring to the experiences of China, the Union of Kansai Governments adopted an 
independent method of pairing support. That is to say, by alternating the local government in the 
union—for example, for assistance for flood damage in Wakayama Prefecture, other towns 
entered to provide assistance even when assistance was being provided from within the 
Wakayama Prefecture region—instead of pairing support through single pairs, it facilitated 
responses through pairing support in blocks. One of the strengths of the assistance provided by 
the Union of Kansai Governments is that the specialists and the stage where the assistance take 
place can be supplemented and so the assistance is unlikely to lose its momentum or burn out. 
So Japan’s pairing support also utilized a “soft” aspect.
Support can be provided over a long period. Moreover, because multilayered support at each 
administrative level, such as prefectures, government-ordinance cities, core cities, and 
municipalities become possible, for example even if the prefectural employees don’t know how 
to respond, employees of municipalities will know how and are able to respond. Coordination is 
speeded up, information is consolidated, and it became easier to manage traffic. Overall 
capabilities are improved.
The goal of the central government in adopting pairing support in China, which has major 
economic disparities domestically, is that by entrusting financial resources for the restoration 
and recovery to comparatively affluent provinces (cities), the fiscal burden placed on the central 
government can be reduced. Also, it can be used to mitigate the problem of domestic disparities 
through a horizontal redistribution. By deciding on which province and city is allocated to which 
area and by recognizing the achievements of those who provide major support quickly, it fosters 
competition for the recovery according to who provides the most support the fastest. As a result, 
the aim is to achieve a major outcome for the recovery as a whole. Moreover, in order to achieve 
the goal of achieving harmony between each level of society, as expressed by the slogan “the 
reconciliation of society,” that the Chinese Communist Party announced in 2004, this method 
can be said to be symbolic of the Chinese government’s effective recovery policy.
As a consequence of this policy, a phenomenon could be seen in Dujiangyan City, which 
received assistance from the most affluent city of Shanghai City, in which compared to other 
regions, it clearly received superior support, from the construction of temporary school buildings 
through to the construction of permanent infrastructure. The Shanghai City Government has built 
a large museum on the recovery work in Dujiangyan City, which displays an exhibit on the 
6 Municipalities top seminar, fiscal 2012, “The Great East Japan Earthquake and pairing support—aiming to increase 
capabilities to receive support and preparing for a major disaster—” Yamanaka, Shigeki, February 8, 2013 (Friday) 
at City Plaza Osaka (http: //www.masse.or.jp/ikkrwebBrowse/material/files/group/17/topseminar.pdf)
13
Otani
success of the recovery. The local people leaked that “This is government constructed publicity 
(it only shows one aspect of the actual situation).” The appearance of the surrounding area has 
been transformed and it has become a modern and new commercial district with many European-
style coffee shops. There is a large park in the vicinity of the museum and sign has been erected 
showing a blueprint of the recovery plan, such as the high-rise recovery residences that are 
scheduled to be built in the future, and it resembles the construction in a major city. On the other 
side of it is an expanse of tranquil farmland.
The Wenchuan Earthquake commemorative museums have been constructed over a wide area 
in the disaster-affected region. In a village that was completely destroyed in the earthquake in 
Beichuan Qiang Autonomous County, which is famous for its Tibetan ethnic minority, in 
conjunction with the objective to develop it as a tourism destination, a new town was constructed 
on vast farmland in two and a half years. The cost of the construction is thought to be more than 
100 billion yen. General hospitals, such as the Qiang Autonomous County People’s Hospital, 
have been established with the latest equipment, while schools have been constructed to be 
earthquake-proof. An exhibition space to publicize the disaster recovery was created and 
explanations are provided in both Chinese and English (Otani, 2012). As can be seen in Chapter 
9 of the National Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Comprehensive 
Plan (Table 3), one of the government’s industrial policies is to promote the development of the 
tourism industry, as it is aiming to achieve a recovery in the disaster-affected areas through 
tourism.
Following the catastrophic damage in Beichuan County, where many of the Qiang Tibetan 
minority live, the reconstruction project accompanied the transition from the former Beichuan 
County, which had traditional houses and streets unique to the area, to the new Beichuan County, 
which was a town constructed for tourism, such as by having the ethnic Qiang wear traditional 
ethnic costumes. But various discussions have taken place, such as on whether this was the kind 
of life requested by the disaster victims and whether the enormous investment in constructing 
Photograph: The recovery museum constructed in Dujiangyan City by the Shanghai City 
Government (left), Photograph on display: the pairing support signing ceremony (right). 
Explanations in the displays in China’s recovery museums are provided in English as 
well as in Chinese. Clearly it was built by Shanghai for publicity purposes. (June 2013, 
taken by the author)
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the museum was made ahead of the investment in reconstructing the disaster victims’ lives7. 
But even in the new Beichuan County, in addition to tourism there are plans to construct a 
vast industrial district continuing on from the tourism district.
Table 5 shows the one-to-one relationship between the government agency and the province 
(city) damaged in the earthquake. However, it is not the case that each government agency only 
carried out the activities in the disaster-affected areas shown in the Table; rather, they have 
jurisdiction over the entire Sichuan Province.
7 Mainichi Shimbun, May 12, 2009, “One year after the rapid recovery following the Sichuan Earthquake in China 
(no.1) The voices of the disaster victims are not being heard “on the preservation of the collapsed school buildings,” 
and the government is giving priority to the construction of museum.” Sankei Shimbun, May 13, 2009, “President 
Hu Jintao “Recovery achieved in two years,” One year Memorial Ceremony of the Sichuan Earthquake.” Mainichi 
Shimbun, A journalist’s eye, Kenichi Nuruzawa, China Bureau, July 10, 2012. “Four years after the Sichuan Earth-
quake in China; sharing the experiences of Japan on China on relief for disaster victims. Bewilderment of relief 
workers on location at venues being turned into tourist destinations, local people also tell of their dissatisfaction 
about what is being left behind.”
table 5. 
The pairing (one-to-one) of a Sichuan Province government agency with a county (city) damaged in the 
earthquake
Sichuan Province Development and Reforms Committee ⇒ Beichuan Qiang Autonomous County
Sichuan Province Traffic Agency ⇒ Wenchuan County
Sichuan Province Construction Agency ⇒ Qingchuan County
Sichuan Province Economic Committee ⇒ Mianzhu City
Sichuan Province National Assets Administration Committee ⇒ Shifang City
Sichuan Province Education Agency ⇒ Dujiangyan City
Sichuan Province Civil Administration Agency ⇒ Pingwu County
Sichuan Province Finance Agency ⇒ An County
Sichuan Province National Land Resources Agency ⇒ Jiangyou City
Sichuan Province Labor and Social Security Agency ⇒ Pengzhou City
Sichuan Province Water Supply Agency ⇒ Mao County
Sichuan Province Agriculture Agency ⇒ Li County
Sichuan Province Forestry Agency ⇒ Heishui County
Sichuan Province Commerce Agency ⇒ Songpan County
Sichuan Province Culture Agency ⇒ Xiaojin County
Sichuan Province Sanitation Agency ⇒ Hanyuan County
Sichuan Province Environmental Protection Agency ⇒ Chongzhou City
Sichuan Province Press, Publication, Radio,  
Film and Television Agency ⇒ Jiange County
Reference: (Otani, 2012), Map of Sichuan Province, Chengdu Cartographic Publishing House, 2010, p.125
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5. 2008, “China’s NGO Year One”
As was previously described, it can be said that there clearly appeared in the Chinese 
government an administration style that encouraged a top-down approach about the recovery 
itself. But it is necessary to see the form taken by China’s NGOs as one of the characteristics of 
Chinese society in the recovery from the Wenchuan Earthquake.
A phenomenon in present day Chinese society worthy of special mention is the major 
transformation that occurred in it following the earthquakes, with many NGOs coming into 
existence and a movement emerging in which people became volunteers.
First, this can be easily explained as China’s NGOs emerged in a different society to that of 
Japan and the West. As such, NGOs don’t actually exist in China and a situation has continued 
in which many NGOs are actually GONGO (government-organized NGO). The spur for the 
development of grass-roots NGOs was the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing 
in 1995. During the Congress, the first Women’s NGO Forum was held in Beijing, and for the 
first time, the concept of NGOs and the related problems became to be known in China. At that 
time, the All China Women’s Federation, which came to play a leading role as an NGO that 
developed its organization nationwide, was also a GONGO, as was the Red Cross Society of 
China, which is extremely active following a disaster.
In China in 1998, the State Council renamed the former Bureau for the Administration of 
Social Groups within the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Bureau of Civil Organizations and 
positioned NGOs as “civil organizations” in public venues (Zhai 齊 2000: 30). Following the 
November 2007 Exchange Meeting on the Nationwide Construction of Social Organizations and 
Experiences of Administrative Affairs, instead of “civil organizations,” the name “social 
organizations” started to be used. The government designated that “social organizations” were 
“social groups” “non-enterprise units,” and “foundations” that had registered at each level of 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Based on the directives of the State Council of Ordinance No.250, 
“Social Organizations Registration Management Ordinance” and Ordinance No.251 “Non-
Enterprise Units Registration Management Provisional Ordinance,” that were promulgated on 
October 25, 1998, and Ordinance No.400 “Foundations Management Ordinance” that was 
promulgated on March 8, 2004, social groups, non-enterprise units, and foundations that 
correctly registered with and were administered and supervised by the government sector were 
designated to be “lawful NGOs (legal NGOs)” (Zhang ∙ Otani 2014) In China, NGOs are broadly 
classified into three types: “registered NGOs (legal NGOs),” “grass-roots NGOs,” and “residents’ 
organizations” (Li 2009: 4-5).
Prior to the earthquake, NGOs in Chinese society were concentrated in regions such as Beijing 
and Yunnan Province and were active in areas including women’s issues, environment protection, 
and poverty. But following the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, there emerged a wave of NGOs 
in the form of the voluntary activities of people throughout the nation. Mr. Yong Guang Xu, 
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who is a pioneer of philanthropic projects in China, positioned 2008 as the “Birth year of NGOs 
in China” (Zhang ∙ Otani, 2014).
But is extremely difficult to register as an NGO in China and in fact, many NGOs are unable 
to register as NGOs and give upon the complicated procedures and register as a company, 
thereby having to pay tax. An organization cannot accept donations if it not registered as 
an NGO8. Article 3 and Article 5 of the “Non-Enterprise Units Registration Management 
Provisional Ordinance” (promulgated October 25, 1998, as the State Council Directive No.251) 
prescribes that it is necessary to have a review by the “ministry with jurisdiction over operations” 
and registration by an “registration management institution” (the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the 
State Council and the departments of civil affairs at the level of each region above the provincial 
level; in other words, dual administration). Article 11 stipulates that “There can be only one 
organization per field per administrative sector.” So establishing multiple organizations in the 
same region that are working in the same field is prohibited. The registration of organizations is 
also used for the objectives of clarifying the management of the industry categories of economic 
agents under a planned economy, avoiding competition, and securing the benefits of each group. 
So in the large majority of cases, “the ministry with jurisdiction over operations” cannot be 
expected to bear responsibility for the registration and they do not actively engage in registrations. 
Therefore, it is difficult for voluntary civil organizations to find the “ministry with jurisdiction 
over operations.” (Zhang ∙ Otani, 2014). So it is problematic for grass-root NGOs to become 
legal organizations and many of them are, in actual terms, excluded from registration (Li, 2010: 
2-3). Due these sorts of conditions, it was difficult for NGOs to register as NGOs and continue 
their activities following the Wenchuan Earthquake.
After the 2008 earthquake, there were 300 private-sector organizations participating in 
disaster-relief activities in Sichuan Province. According to the report “Disaster-Relief Activities 
in China” (2009) by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, the number of domestic 
and international volunteers had risen to more than three million people, while in the background 
there was also thought to be another 10 million volunteers providing support. Mr. Yong 
Guang Xu, who is a pioneer of philanthropic projects in China, positioned 2008 as the “Year 
One of NGOs in China” (Zhang ∙ Otani, 2014). It was also called “the birth year of volunteerism” 
(Shinya ∙ Yamaguchi, 2009). The NGO 512 Voluntary Relief Service Center set up by researchers 
in the Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences established an information platform and was 
comprised of 38 allied NGO organizations and more than 80 affiliated organizations. It has 
left documentary record of its experiences, including research reports9. Many NGOs took on 
the “foundation” form.
But five years after the May 12th earthquake, many NGOs had ceased their activities. Yet 
8 “Postquake activism blunted by Beijing”, Japan Times, 12 May 2009.
9 Please refer to Guo (郭) (2012), etc.
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even today, there are still grass-roots NGOs in the disaster areas that are continuing to provide 
support for the post-earthquake recovery. They also played a major role in the disaster relief 
following the earthquake of April 20, 2013 (Zhang ∙ Otani, 2014).
At the time of the Lushan Earthquake of April 20, 2013, based on the experience of the 
Wenchuan Earthquake of May 12, 2008, the coordination of NGOs and the government was 
physically strengthened. The Ya-an City Earthquake Mitigation and Disaster Relief Social 
Organizations and Volunteer Service Center was established in Ya-an City and it is symbolic 
that practically all of the NGO groups that were active in the disaster-affected areas following 
the April 20th Lushan Earthquake had their office or a desk in this building. But it can be said 
that in terms of the system, the government strengthened its management of NGO volunteer 
organizations. Ya-an City is a distance of 200km from Chengdu City (2 hours by car) and the 
distances from Ya-an City to the towns and villages that suffered extensive damage also require 
car journeys of several hours (the region is vast).
Previously, it was stated that more than 300 private-sector organization participated in the 
disaster-relief activities in Sichuan Province after the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, but the 
majority of these could not or did not continue their activities. However, precisely because some 
of the NGOs continued with their activities from 2008, they were able to respond quickly 
following the Lushan Earthquake of April 20, 201310. A case study taken up in research 
(Zhang ∙ Otani, 2014) describes an NGO that was created to provide mental care support to 
mothers who had lost their only child in the earthquake, but that following the Lushan Earthquake 
of April 20, 2013, changed the content of its activities to provide mental care support in 
elementary schools for children in the disaster-affected areas.
6. The various problems involved in reconstructing people’s lives
When considering the reconstruction of people’s lives following the earthquakes, it is 
necessary to look at the social security system that is unique to China. When discussing China’s 
social security system, the fact that it is one nation but two-systems cannot be disregarded. A 
discussion of China’s social security system generally relates to that one part of the population 
that is registered in urban areas. Within the same country, the non-rural-registered population 
(the urban population) and the rural-registered population are treated completely differently and 
only the minority of the people register in urban areas are recipients of the social security system 
(Otani, 2007: 157). In other words, China’s social security system can be said to be limited in 
that it only covers a minority of people who are registered in urban areas. So a social security 
system is not in place for those registered in rural villages. China’s establishment of a social 
security system as a measure to address its rapidly aging population, which is one of the problems 
10 Please refer to (Zhang ∙ Otani, 2014) as research that presents this case study.
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it is facing, is one of the most serious issues to be dealt with by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security in the Chinese government. But at the same time, it already has its hands completely 
full dealing with the population registered in urban areas. Occasionally, newspapers will report 
that social security is to be expanded to those registered in rural villages or that measures are to 
be implemented that would register several thousand of those registered in rural villages in the 
urban register. But this would be just a drop in the ocean. In this sort of discriminatory society, 
for the people registered in rural villages, children are not simply to help them with work on the 
farm; they are also security for their old age. Moreover, to lose one’s own child is not only very 
sad, it has also become a real issue in modern China due to its unique one-child population 
policy. On the noticeboards in the temporary housing within the disaster-affected areas following 
the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, the Family Planning Commission posted notices that, “Parents 
who lost their only child in the earthquake are permitted to have another child”11 (observed on 
location in March 2009). This was not effective when it was observed in August soon after the 
earthquake in May 2008, but it was decided upon on July 25, 2008, at the 4th meeting of the 11th 
Sichuan Province Standing Committee to Report to the People. It also provided fertility treatment 
free of charge12. But conversely, it was reported that many of the disaster victims suffered 
miscarriages and stillbirths. This was not only due to psychological stress, as environmental 
factors have also been pointed to, such as the bonding material used for the construction of the 
temporary housing and the chemical formaldehyde that was used in the homes’ foundations13. 
There are similar reports of these factors causing sick building syndrome in the disaster-affected 
areas following Hurricane Katrina in the United States. Among about 5,000 married couples who 
were exempted from the one-child policy as they lost their child in the earthquake, in the two 
years following the earthquake approximately 2,000 couples had already had a child, and the 
woman was pregnant in a further 500 couples14.
No data has been compiled on elderly disaster victims, but a Hong Kong doctor providing 
emergency medical treatment in the disaster-affected areas after the earthquake contributed an 
article to a U.K. medical journal and reported that, “While there was no data on them, there were 
concerns for what would become of the elderly disaster victims based on what we felt intuitively 
on location” (Chan, EYY, 2008).
These feelings of the people on location, that a large proportion of the disaster victims were 
elderly, raised concerns not only about the elderly disaster-victims’ health problems, but also 
11 Japan Times, May 28, 2008 “China’s one-child policy makes exception for quake”
12 Yomiuri Shimbun, May 9 2009 “In shadow of the recovery: the one year from the Sichuan Earthquake (no.2) 
Authorities fear the anger of parents who question why the names of the child they lost have been erased”
13 Mainichi Shimbun, May 13, 2009, “On year on from China’s rapid recovery from the Sichuan Earthquake (no.2) 
Bereaved families from the collapsed school buildings, even incentives to have another child…”. Mainichi 
Shimbun, May 12, 2009 “One year after the Sichuan Earthquake, the authorities are controlling information on 
a series of miscarriages and stillbirths within the temporary housing”
14 Sankei Shimbun, May 17, 2010 “Construction with short cuts; two years after the Sichuan Earthquake, confronta-
tion on the collapse of school buildings”
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due to the fact that the Sichuan Earthquakes 
occurred when China is undergoing a rapid 
aging of its population, it has also been reported 
that intuitively there are major concerns for how 
those elderly that survived the earthquake will 
fare in the future. Even if they survived the 
earthquake, an increasing number of these 
people in actuality cannot do farming work and 
cannot go to a different location to work, so 
cannot earn a livelihood15. Originally in Sichuan 
Province since the economic reforms and the 
openness policy, the population moving to a 
different location to work (the fluid population) 
has been increasing and this increase has been 
accelerated by the disasters. In each of the disaster-
affected areas, the International Federation of 
the Red Cross and the Red Cross Society of 
China has constructed and are managing homes 
for the elderly16.
Many disaster victims in the mountainous 
regions where the earthquake struck were 
farmers. Also, many of them were members of 
the Tibetan ethnic minority, which is one of 
the problems that China faces. In China, the 
disparity between the coastal region and Sichuan 
Province in western China is considerable. 
Moreover, the economic disparity between ethnic minorities living in rural villages in 
mountainous regions and the affluent urban population is also large. Even if rural farmers go to 
the cities to work, they are still registered in their rural village and changing their registration to 
be included in the urban-population census is not an easy task.
Another problem related to the reconstruction of people’s lives is those people who, although 
they survived the Wenchuan Earthquake, suffered serious injuries. As was previously described, 
many people registered in rural villages do not receive social security. But in the recovery 
plan, the Chinese government indicated that it would newly build rehabilitation centers and 
recovery centers that were considerate to people with serious injuries, and the central 
15 Mainichi Shimbun, July 15, 2008 “China’s Olympics” on the eve of its opening, (1) Poverty in the Sichuan Earth-
quake disaster-affected area. No jobs, “Prestige,” Supporting moving to other locations for work.
16 Japan Times, May 12, 2009 “Quake survivors crave return to normal life”, page 4.
Photograph: Notification posted on a signboard 
by the Family Planning Committee in Pengzhou 
City Lichun county Baiguo community (麗春
鎮白果社区) temporary housing constructed 
with the support of Fuzhou City, Fujian Province 
(taken by the author, March 12, 2009)
Photograph: An elderly man in the mountain-
ous district of Wenchuan Earthquake disaster-
affected areas stares vacantly and cries, “Everyone 
is dead.” He does not understand the standard 
Chinese dialect (taken by the author in 2008 
August).
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government’s plan itself was intended to contain content that would take into consideration 
people with serious injuries (Otani, 2012). But conversely, those registered in rural villages with 
serious injuries and their families were confronted with the major barrier that they were not 
covered by social security and so were forced to bear the major burden of their medical costs17. 
Because there is no system for major earthquakes if there are no government measures to respond 
to it, it can be said that thanks to the earthquake, if only temporarily an opportunity arose to 
put a system in place.
While on the one hand the Chinese government prioritized the recovery from the Wenchuan 
Earthquake, on the other hand it conducted a campaign using a slogan that urged the disaster 
victims to recover by their own efforts. The government prioritized restoring infrastructure, 
but it can be argued that it left unaddressed the issue of what measures should it investigate 
and take to meet the needs of individual people for the reconstruction of their lives. For example, 
the Chinese government created a recovery plan on the scale of around 15 trillion yen and 
through this plan, aimed to reconstruct 2.18 million households in the rural villages alone. The 
plan included “securing jobs” for the disaster victims and raising their standards of living to a 
level above that of prior to the earthquake. However, the funds from the government alone were 
insufficient for the disaster victims even to be able to move and buy a house in a different 
location. If they moved to a different location, they would not be able to work on their farmland 
and feed their animals, so they would lose their source of income18. Moreover, attempting to 
“restore infrastructure” required implementing large-scale engineering projects, such as for 
traffic and communications. The recovery plan, which was to be progressed for the prestige of 
the nation, was focused on the construction of homes. But in reality, funding from the government 
alone was insufficient and the residents were forced to bear much of the cost themselves. 
Building homes is the key to reconstructing lives, but in the case of rural villages, the government 
paid a subsidy of 20,000 yuan (about 280,000 yen) for a home per household, and in addition 
prepared a system of low interest loans of about 300,000 yen. But even if the disaster victims 
received subsidies, building a new home costs around 100,000 yuan (about 1.4 million yen)19. 
Even one year after the earthquake, many of the disaster victims did not have work and instead 
only had debts and so felt anxious about their lives in the future (Otani, 2012). According to the 
International Federation of the Red Cross, even after three years, the disaster victims were still 
having problems finding work and with debt20.
17 May 14, 2009 Mainichi Shimbun “China over year after the rapid recovery from the Sichuan Earthquake (no.3) The 
heavy burden of medical expenses; disaster victims after leaving hospital”
18 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 8, 2009, evening edition, One year after the Sichuan Earthquake China is in the middle 
of its recovery (no.1) between the light and dark of creating a tourist region
19 Sankei Shimbun, November 12, 2008 “Half a year on from the Sichuan Earthquake protests to eradicate okara 
construction, rising anxiety, people want to return to their own homes, satisfactory food, clothing and housing even 
when living in tents for, subsidies of 20,000 yuan for the reconstruction of lives”
20 Asahi Shimbun, May 10, 2011 “Eradicating the anxiety about the strong recovery. Three years after the Sichuan 
Earthquake, clearing out the protests, taking no notice, two million unemployed, people are in debt.”
21
Otani
Even if the disaster victims were allocated a new home, in their new lives in a new town 
these new tenants still had to repay a large housing loan. For example, the media reported on 
the case of a 76 year old man (September 18, 2011) who had lost a son and his home in the 
earthquake and was allocated a new 3LDK home (approximately 90 square meters). However, 
while his bedding was provided by the government, he had to take out a loan of 50,000 yuan 
(about 600,000 yen) from the government in order to buy the home and also other household 
goods. Due to the lack of work opportunities locally, his two surviving sons had left to go and 
find work in the city and so no longer lived with him. It was noted that the difficulties he faced 
in living happily together with his family was a result of the government-led response to the 
earthquake that prioritized the speed of the recovery (Otani, 2012).
In Chinese society, which is strongly government led, a problem is that even if the residents 
have concerns, the government provides no window for them to consult with it on these concerns. 
It has been pointed out that the recovery work was progressed without communication between 
the government and the residents and as a result, there arose conflict between the two sides 
(Otani, 2012). So while from the outside it appeared that progress was being made in the 
recovery, such as the progress made in constructing buildings, voices of discontent could be 
heard among the local people. There were also people who were concerned that while construction 
homes had been completed, they were of poor quality. Concrete would peel off the outer walls 
and cracks would appear in the inner walls and some residents complained that corners had been 
cut in the construction work.
In March of this year, the signatures of around 300 residents of the newly constructed housing, 
or 15% of all the residents, were collected and an appeal was presented to the local government 
to test that the buildings were actually earthquake proof. In response, the local government 
simply claimed that the buildings were safe but provided no explanation on their earthquake 
resistance. These residents feel considerable unease about the buildings’ safety, as many people 
lost their lives in the Sichuan Earthquakes when the buildings they were in collapsed. The 
Chinese government created earthquake-proof standards so that buildings could survive 
earthquakes of a similar magnitude.
The issue of the destruction of elementary and junior high school buildings in the earthquakes 
is one that even now for the Chinese government is a sensitive and taboo, but it seems to be one 
that must be touched upon. There are suspicions that the elementary and junior high schools were 
built through okara construction, in which local government officials collude with the 
construction company in order to keep down the costs of the construction by using inferior 
materials. It is thought that for this reason, the elementary and junior high school buildings 
collapsed, even though the buildings around them remained standing. So school buildings that 
should have been safe ended up costing many children their lives. These suspicions have 
developed into a social problem. One year after the earthquake, the government announced that 
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5,335 children had either died or were still missing21. The parents who lost their child demand 
that the local government determine the reasons why the buildings collapsed and the people 
responsible, but they have not received any response. However, the government’s consistent 
position has been that it will not carry out an investigation as “The cause was solely the large 
magnitude of the earthquakes and there were no other causes, so it is not possible to investigate 
who was responsible.” The local authorities urge the residents sign an oath that “in return for a 
payment of between 60,000 to 80,000 yuan (from 840,000 yen to 1.12 million yen)22, they would 
cease activities to pursue those responsible,” and used methods such as taking people into 
custody so that people would not refuse to sign it23.
The public security authorities severely limit gatherings of bereaved families that might 
develop into a protest meeting, strictly monitored those mothers who were particularly vocal, 
and worked to prevent any protest activities. According to the Hong Kong media, in February 
2010 a Chinese author who investigated children who had been killed in the earthquake received 
a prison sentence of five years on the charge of agitating to overthrow the government. A famous 
architectural designer in China who was going to appear in court as a witness was physically 
assaulted by the police immediately before his court appearance and was unable to appear. It has 
been noted that the relevant authorities have tried to resolve the problem of the collapsed 
buildings by providing vague answers (Otani, 2012). In addition, in places there have been 
attempts to expunge the existence of the collapsed elementary schools from people’s memories, 
such as by rapidly constructing new buildings on the sites where they stood.
Noticeboards indicating emergency evacuation sites have been erected in parks and by school 
buildings. However, while it can be assumed that expansive parks are appropriate locations, 
doubts remain whether the safety of school buildings has been confirmed and that the notices 
indicated evacuation sites have simply been erected by these school buildings.
7. Conclusion
The Sichuan Wenchuan Earthquake of May 12, 2008, was a major shock for the Chinese 
government and Chinese society. Moreover, it was followed by the Sichuan Lushan-Ya-an 
Earthquake of April 20, 2013. This was also a major earthquake, but the memories of 2008 
were still fresh and the recovery from it was still underway, and in this context it can be said that 
the response to it was rapid. But the Chinese government did not accept support from overseas 
21 Sankei Shimbun, May 8, 2009, “5,335 children were killed or are missing due to the Sichuan Earthquake,” 
The provincial government releases favorable appraisal
22 Mainichi Shimbun, May 12, 2009, Reporter’s eyes, “One year after the Sichuan Earthquake, “Hopes for the 
Chinese government, the road to recovery is sharing the resentment and not silencing the voices of the disaster 
victims,” Joji Uramatsu, China Bureau
23 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 11, 2009, “One year after the Sichuan Earthquake China is in the middle of its 
recovery (no.1) Faulty construction; the bereaved families continue to search for answers”
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as it had done in 2008 and attempted to respond to the earthquake by itself. The Wenchuan 
Earthquake of May 2008 occurred just before the Beijing Olympics in August, and throughout 
the world, special reports took up the various problems facing China that was achieving 
remarkable economic growth. The Wenchuan Earthquake that struck at this time not only caused 
major damage to a vast area of national land and to people, particularly in Sichuan Province, 
it also caused the eyes of the world to further focus on how the Chinese government was steering 
its nation. The recovery work became a major project connected to the prestige of the nation, 
similarly to the Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo, and the Chinese government responded 
rapidly.
The Earthquake Mitigation and Disaster Relief Command Center was set up in the State 
Council, and Chinese Premier Wen Jinbao himself took overall charge of it. In June, the 
Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Ordinance was formulated, 
followed in August by the National Wenchuan County Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction 
Comprehensive Plan. Then in December, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters was revised. The comprehensive plan 
was originally a three-year plan, but it was shrunk to two years and the Communist Party 
announced as a great achievement that it had actually completed it in two and a half years. The 
Great West China Development Plan that had been begun before the earthquake was accelerated, 
while the competition for support was also accelerated by utilizing the pairing support method. 
While the extremely rapid government-initiated response is one of the characteristics of the 
Chinese government’s disaster-recovery policy and its implementation, but the earthquakes did 
bring to the surface problems in Chinese society that had started to attract attention even before 
the earthquakes, such as disparities between regions and the fluid population. These problems, 
which include the social security system-related problem that is unique to China of the 
discrimination against the population registered in rural areas compared to those registered in 
urban areas that is occurring in conjunction with the rapid aging of its population, also connects 
to the problems experienced by individual disaster victims in reconstructing their lives. Moreover, 
the Sichuan Earthquakes became the starting point following the launch of the new China for 
Photograph: a notice for an evacuation site in a large park 
within Chengdu City (taken by the author in June 2013 June)
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people’s activities as volunteers and in NGOs, and in this way NGOs in Chinese society are 
systemically different to those in the West and in Japan. But their activities became an opportunity 
to expand the framework of the support to reconstruct people’s lives. How is the Chinese 
government using NGOs, while registering them and managing and restricting their activities? 
Going forward, it will be necessary to continuously keep a close watch on their development, 
together with the establishment in Chinese society of social security system for the disaster 
victims. China will need to continue to respond for both hard and soft aspects; namely, in 
addition to establishing and maintaining infrastructure, including for local residents, to also 
provide support for reconstructing the lives of disaster victims, such as job opportunities and 
income, and furthermore to provide them with mental support.
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